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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
The Unique Effects of Relatively Recent Conflict on Cognitive Control  
by 
Jackson Stuart Colvett 
Master of Arts in Psychological and Brain Sciences 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019 
Professor Julie Bugg, Chair 
In tasks such as Stroop, our past experiences with conflict influence our ability to attend to goal-
relevant information and ignore irrelevant information. There exists evidence that conflict 
experiences on at least two timescales affect cognitive control. The “immediate” timescale is 
evidenced by congruency sequence effects while the “long” timescale is evidenced by list-wide 
proportion congruence effects. What remains underspecified is whether relatively recent 
experiences with conflict may also uniquely influence cognitive control and how experiences on 
different timescales are weighted. The present, pre-registered experiments aimed to assess the 
role of relatively recent conflict by examining the potential effects of an “intermediate” timescale 
(i.e., several preceding trials). A novel Stroop paradigm was developed to isolate the effects of 
the intermediate timescale and cognitive control was measured via frequency- and contingency-
unbiased diagnostic items. In Experiment 1 (N = 61), I manipulated the level of conflict 
experienced in the intermediate timescale for lists matched in proportion congruence. Controlling 
for conflict experiences in the long and immediate timescales, I found that conflict in the 
intermediate timescale affected cognitive control. Experiment 2 (N = 60) found that the effect of 
conflict in the intermediate timescale may depend on that conflict defying the long timescale. 
These novel findings highlight the need to expand theories of cognitive control to incorporate the 
 
viii 
intermediate timescale and the interaction of the intermediate timescale with other timescales of 




Cognitive control processes allow the pursuit of goal-directed behavior in favor of 
alternative compelling or habitual behaviors (Cohen, 2017). Prior experiences resolving conflicts 
between competing responses affect cognitive control (e.g., whether a focused scope of attention 
is engaged whereby processing of goal-irrelevant information is decreased and/or goal-relevant 
information is increased, or a relaxed scope of attention is engaged). Consider driving a car on 
the highway. A car suddenly cutting in front of you might elicit conflict that heightens your focus 
on goal-relevant information, demonstrating the effects of conflict on the immediate timescale. 
On a longer timescale, your focus while driving might be influenced by all accumulated 
experiences since getting on the highway. For example, if the highway has been mostly busy (or 
mostly empty), this will likely induce generally focused (or relaxed) attention. But what if you 
suddenly encounter a lot of traffic in a stretch of highway that was relatively empty? What effect 
will this experience on an “intermediate” timescale have on cognitive control? Will the control 
system maintain a relaxed scope of attention (consistent with the long timescale) or will the 
recent conflict lead to a heightening of control? If it does, will the heightening be above and 
beyond that caused by the last car that cut in front of you (immediate timescale)?  
Prior research on cognitive control, including computational models, has focused 
primarily on effects of conflict on the immediate and long timescales. One such model is the 
influential conflict monitoring account that proposed conflict monitoring as a mechanism by 
which experiences with conflict lead to a recruitment of cognitive control (Botvinick, Braver, 
Brach, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). According to this model, some control adjustments occur in 
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response to conflict experiences1 on the previous trial. Consistent with this idea, individuals are 
less susceptible to conflict after experiencing an incongruent (i.e., conflicting) trial than after 
experiencing a congruent (i.e., non-conflicting) trial, presumably because control is heightened 
when the previous trial is incongruent (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; for reviews, Egner 
2007; Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014). These congruency sequence 
effects are relatively transient (Egner, Ely, & Grinband, 2010; Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, & 
Notebaert 2014) and exemplify how the “immediate” timescale of conflict accumulation 
influences cognitive control.  
In contrast, a different effect provides an example of how control is affected by conflict 
experiences that accumulate across dozens (e.g., Bugg, Diede, Cohen-Shikora, Selmeczy, 2015) 
or hundreds of trials (i.e., a block or list; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). The list-wide proportion 
congruence (PC; what percentage of experienced trials are congruent) effect is the pattern 
whereby congruency effects are smaller in mostly incongruent (MI) lists than mostly congruent 
(MC) lists (see Bugg, 2014; Bugg & Chanani, 2011; Gonthier, Braver, & Bugg, 2016; Hutchison, 
2011 for evidence of list-wide PC effects when controlling for known confounds; for reviews see 
Bugg, 2012; Bugg & Crump, 2012). The conflict monitoring account suggests that when higher 
overall conflict is detected in the list, there is a subsequent increase in cognitive control 
(Botvinick et al., 2001). In other words, the conflict monitoring model also captures adjustments 
in control based on conflict accumulation over a long timescale and not just the preceding trial 
(immediate timescale). Findings show that list-wide PC effects are observed independent of the 
congruency sequence effect (Torres-Quesada, Funes, & Lupiáñez, 2013; Torres-Quesada, 
 
1 The phrase "conflict experiences” is used here to refer to experiences with either conflicting (i.e., incongruent) or 
non-conflicting (i.e., congruent) trials. The phrase conflict experiences is used rather than conflict, as it is also the 
case that the absence of conflict is a signal for control adjustments (e.g., Schlaghecken & Martini, 2012). 
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Milliken, Lupiáñez, & Funes, 2014), suggesting that the long timescale is separable from the 
immediate timescale.  
While effects of the immediate and long timescales have been examined across hundreds 
of studies, there are several theoretical gaps in the literature. Two important gaps were of interest 
in the present study. First, do relatively recent experiences with conflict (i.e., the intermediate 
timescale) influence cognitive control above and beyond the effect of the immediate timescale? 
That is, do experiences occurring on multiple trials preceding the current trial shape the 
heightening or relaxation of control beyond the effect of the immediately preceding trial? The 
conflict monitoring account states that the amount of control on a given trial should be based on 
“an exponentially weighted average of conflict over multiple preceding trials, rather than only on 
the immediately preceding trial” (Botvinick et al., 2001; p. 639). This implies that conflict 
experiences in the intermediate timescale should affect cognitive control.  
Only a few prior studies have reported findings that speak to the role of the intermediate 
timescale. In a flanker task with nine participants, as the number of preceding compatible trials 
increased from one to six, reaction time on incompatible trials increased (Durston et al., 2003). 
However, reaction time on incompatible trials did not significantly decrease as a function of the 
number of preceding incompatible trials. Other studies with larger samples have found a 
significant effect of several preceding trials, including multiple incongruent trials. In a Simon 
task, reaction time declined on trial n as a function of the number of consecutive trials of the 
same trial type preceding trial n for both congruent and incongruent trials (Horga et al., 2011). In 
a Stroop task, congruency sequence effects were accentuated by multiple preceding congruent 
trials and attenuated by multiple preceding incongruent trials (Jiménez & Méndez, 2013; 
Jiménez & Méndez, 2014). These findings suggest that control is adjusted in response to conflict 
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experiences that occur more trials back than just trial n – 1, supporting a role for the intermediate 
timescale. 
The second gap concerns how experiences on different timescales are weighted and what 
factors affect this weighting. Although the aforementioned studies (e.g., Durston et al., 2003; 
Horga et al., 2011; Jiménez & Méndez, 2013; Jiménez & Méndez, 2014) provided evidence for 
the intermediate timescale, these studies uniformly used lists with 50% congruent trials and 
therefore they could not assess whether effects of the intermediate timescale might depend on the 
conflict experiences preceding the intermediate timescale. For example, the weighting of conflict 
experiences on the intermediate timescale might vary based on the long timescale (e.g., whether 
it is MC or MI). The conflict monitoring account (and related models; see Blais et al., 2007; 
Verguts & Notebaert, 2008), however, assumes a fixed learning rate (i.e., degree to which new 
information is weighted when updating attentional settings; Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & 
Rushworth, 2007). This implies that the effects of the intermediate timescale should be consistent 
regardless of context (e.g., preceding trial history). 
Here, too, only a few prior studies have examined this issue. Aben and colleagues 
developed a statistical model that documented the effects of different timescales of conflict 
accumulation on cognitive control in the flanker task (Aben, Verguts, & Van den Bussche, 2017; 
see Dey, 2019, for replications using a Stroop task). One key finding from this model was that 
multiple trials prior to the immediately preceding trial (7 of the preceding 12 trials in flanker, 
Aben et al., 2017; each of the 8 preceding trials within an 8 trial window in color word Stroop, 
Dey, 2019) significantly informed the level of cognitive control on trial n controlling for the 
effect of the other trials. This further supports that the intermediate timescale does play a role in 
cognitive control adjustments. Most relevant to the second gap in the literature, another key 
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finding was that there was an interaction such that conflict experiences in the intermediate 
timescale (recent trials extending beyond n – 1) were weighted less strongly in MI lists than in 
MC lists. Aben and colleagues interpreted this to mean that recent experiences with conflict have 
less of an influence on cognitive control when the long timescale biases individuals to engage 
proactive control (i.e., sustain a heightened attentional bias across trials; Braver, Gray, & 
Burgess, 2007) than when the system is relatively relaxed and dealing with conflict via reactive 
control. This suggests learning rate may not be fixed, contrary to the conflict monitoring account. 
To take stock, prior research provides suggestive evidence that an intermediate timescale 
of conflict, and not just the immediate and long timescales, affects whether the scope of attention 
on a moment-by-moment basis is relatively focused or relaxed. In addition, there is initial 
evidence based on statistical modeling to suggest that the weighting of the intermediate timescale 
may vary depending on the long timescale. In the current study, I aimed to further understand 
potential effects of the intermediate timescale on cognitive control. One goal was to test a 
prediction from the aforementioned statistical models (Aben et al., 2017; Dey, 2019) regarding 
the interaction between the intermediate timescale and the long timescale. As noted above, the 
modeling demonstrated that the intermediate timescale had a greater effect in MC lists than MI 
lists in a flanker task. The present study tests this prediction in the context of a modified Stroop 
task. Interestingly, and in contrast to the statistical modeling results, prior research has shown 
that the effects of the immediate timescale, as indexed by the congruency sequence effect, do not 
interact with the long timescale (Meier & Kane, 2013). This may imply an important difference 




Another goal of the current study was to extend the scope of the measurement of 
cognitive control beyond a single trial as has been the typical approach to evaluating effects of 
preceding conflict (e.g., trial n – 1) on control (trial n) in studies investigating the intermediate 
timescale (e.g., Durston et al., 2003; Horga et al., 2011; Jiménez & Méndez, 2013; Jiménez & 
Méndez, 2014) as well as the immediate timescale. To achieve this goal, I developed a modified 
Stroop paradigm in which the effects of conflict experiences across different timescales were 
assessed during a diagnostic phase of eight trials that followed the critical manipulations of 
conflict. Through this change, I aimed to understand whether an intermediate conflict 
manipulation produces transient changes in cognitive control limited to a single trial post conflict 
or, potentially, longer-lasting adjustments. Effects on the immediate timescale are typically seen 
as transient (fading after a single trial or long delay between trials; Egner et al., 2010; see also 
Duthoo et al., 2014), but it is possible that conflict experiences in the intermediate timescale 
produce a more sustained effect similar to experiences on the long timescale (e.g., Gonthier et 
al., 2016). 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 adopted an experimental approach to investigate the potential effects of the 
intermediate timescale on cognitive control using a novel variant of the abbreviated lists 
paradigm (Bugg et al., 2015). Each list comprised 26 Stroop trials. For expository purposes, 
consider that there were two phases in each list (see Figure 1): an induction phase (18 trials) that 
was followed by a diagnostic phase (8 trials). Phases were not demarcated from the participants’ 
perspective. The induction phase represented the long timescale and was MC or MI. The last four 
trials of the induction phase represented the intermediate timescale. Critically, in half of the lists 
in each PC condition, the intermediate timescale comprised only the infrequent trial type (i.e., 
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incongruent trials in an MC list). This manipulation is hereafter referred to as a “present” or 
“absent” window. For example, in a MCPRESENT list, the last four trials would be 100% 
incongruent, whereas in an MCABSENT list, congruent and incongruent trials were distributed 
throughout the induction phase in accordance with the PC of the list (in this example, most of 
those trials were congruent).2 Consequently, for the key comparison of MCPRESENT and 
MCABSENT lists (or MIPRESENT and MIABSENT lists), the long timescale was equated.  
The effects of induction, including the presence versus absence of the window, were 
assessed during a subsequent diagnostic phase. For all lists, the diagnostic phase was comprised 
of eight trials. Critically, this meant that, unlike the prior studies investigating the transient effect 
of the intermediate timescale solely on the immediately following trial (trial n), the current study 
assessed whether effects of the intermediate timescale may be sustained beyond that trial to 
multiple following trials. The diagnostic phase was 50% congruent and these trials were novel 
words/colors not used to create the PC bias in the induction phase. The combination of these two 
features enabled me to rule out explanations of performance on the diagnostic trials related to 
item-specific mechanisms such as contingency-learning (e.g., Schmidt & Besner, 2008) and 
bottom-up priming of a focused or relaxed scope of attention (see e.g., Bugg, 2014; see also 
Braem et al., 2019; Bugg, 2017), and instead attribute differences in Stroop effects between 
conditions to induced cognitive control. Additionally, I analyzed the diagnostic phase removing 
the trial immediately following the induction to address the possibility that differences between 
conditions were driven by differences in the immediate timescale. The key question was whether 
performance on the diagnostic items would differ between present and absent lists, that is, 
 
2 In MCABSENT, trials in the window were 70.9% congruent (34 congruent trials out of 48 total trials in window 
across all lists). In MIABSENT, trials in the window were 27.8% congruent (13  




between lists that had the same PC during induction (i.e., equating the long timescale) but 
differing experiences in the intermediate timescale.  
An account that includes an intermediate timescale of conflict experience that interacts 
with the other timescales would predict Stroop effects following an MCPRESENT induction to be 
attenuated in comparison to MCABSENT; the account would also predict Stroop effects to be larger 
following an MIPRESENT induction in comparison to MIABSENT. Statistically, this would manifest 
as a significant three-way interaction between congruence, PC, and window presence. However, 
if the intermediate timescale has no influence on cognitive control beyond the long and 
immediate timescales, no differences should be observed between present and absent conditions 
(and therefore a non-significant three-way interaction). Hypotheses and data for both 
experiments were pre-registered and are available on OSF (see link in author note). 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-one Washington University undergraduates (32 female, Age M = 
18.49, SD = 0.64) participated for course credit. All participants were native English speakers 
with normal or corrected vision and color vision. No participants were excluded. 
Design and Stimuli. I adapted an abbreviated-lists design (Bugg et al., 2015) using 26-
trial lists presenting congruent trials comprising a word and color that matched (e.g., RED in red 
ink) and incongruent trials comprising a word and color that mismatched (e.g., RED in blue ink) 
(see Figure 1). Lists began with a biased induction phase. The purpose of the induction phase 
was to present trials that induce relatively focused (i.e., MI list) or relaxed (i.e., MC list) control; 
the effectiveness of the induction was assessed during the diagnostic phase, which was 
equivalent between conditions. The key manipulation was the presence or absence of an 
experience-defying four-trial window (i.e., in the intermediate timescale) at the end of the 
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induction phase, which preceded assessment of participants’ cognitive control during the 
diagnostic phase. One set of stimuli (RED, BLUE, PURPLE, and WHITE in red, blue, purple, or 
white) served as the Induction Set and was presented during the induction phase according to the 
PC of the list. A second set of stimuli (words GREEN and YELLOW in green and yellow) served 
as the Diagnostic Set and was presented during the diagnostic phase. A key feature of stimuli in 
the diagnostic phase is that they were always 50% congruent. One concern in the present design 
was that participants might become aware that the words/colors green and yellow always 
appeared at the end of the list and this could inadvertently affect their cognitive control. To 
alleviate this concern, two preventive measures were taken: First, a congruent and an 
incongruent trial were randomly selected from trials 1-14 of the induction phase (i.e., two trials 
from the Induction Set) and interchanged with a congruent and incongruent trial from trials 3-8 
of the diagnostic phase (i.e., two trials from the Diagnostic Set). Induction Set trials transplanted 
into the diagnostic phase were excluded from the analysis of diagnostic phase performance (and 
vice versa). Second, filler lists were included in which 13 trials from the Induction Set and 13 
trials from the Diagnostic Set were randomly intermixed throughout the list. These lists were 
50% congruent and excluded from analysis.  
Experiment 1 used 56 lists that were presented in random order: 12 lists for each of the 
following: MCPRESENT, MCABSENT, MIPRESENT, and MIABSENT, plus eight filler lists. The order of 
the trials within lists was pseudorandom. Each color was equally represented for both the 
Induction and Diagnostic Sets. For incongruent trials in the Induction Set, there was an equal 
number of each distractor, such that for an incongruent trial with the color red, the distractor 
word was equally likely to be PURPLE, BLUE, or WHITE. The order of trials within lists was 
fixed to establish the manipulation.  
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Procedure. First, a brief demographic survey was administered. After receiving 
instructions to name the color as quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy, participants 
began the first list of the color-word Stroop task. For each trial, a word stimulus was presented 
centrally on screen in 24-point Arial font. The word remained on screen until the voice key was 
triggered after which an experimenter coded what response was emitted by the participant. Trials 
on which the voice key was triggered by irrelevant speech (e.g., “um”) or extraneous noise (e.g., 
cough), or on which the speech was imperceptible or unintelligible, were coded as scratch trials 
and excluded. There was a 500 ms blank screen before the next stimulus was presented. Trials 
within each list were presented continuously (i.e., there was no break between phases within a 
list). In between each list, participants had an opportunity to rest and verbally told the 
experimenter when to continue. After completing all lists, participants were debriefed. 
Results 
In the current and subsequent experiment, an alpha of .05 was used for all analyses. In 
addition, analyses of RT and error rate excluded trials with RTs less than 200 ms or greater than 
3000 ms (0.95% of trials were removed; cf. Bugg et al., 2015), and analyses of RT also excluded 
error trials. The induction and diagnostic trials were analyzed separately (cf. e.g., Bugg, 2014). 
For each trial type and dependent variable, a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of 
congruence (congruent or incongruent), PC (MC or MI), and intermediate window (present or 
absent) was performed. All reaction times report milliseconds (ms). See Table 1 for descriptive 
statistics. Only theoretically relevant inferential statistics are reported; comprehensive analyses 






Induction items. In order to assess Stroop performance during biased (i.e., MC or MI) 
trials preceding the diagnostic phase, trials in the induction phase were analyzed. Recall that the 
induction phase comprised 14 trials pre-window and the four-trial window. There was a main 
effect of congruence, F(1, 60) = 467.08, p <.001, ηp
2 = .886, such that responses for congruent 
trials (M = 599, SE = 11) were faster than incongruent trials (M = 702, SE = 12). The interaction 
between congruence and PC (F(1, 60) = 286.28, p < .001, ηp
2 = .827) was significant, such that 
the Stroop effect (IncongruentRT – CongruentRT) was larger in MC than MI inductions (i.e., there 
was a list-wide PC effect). In addition, there was a significant three-way interaction between 
congruence, PC, and window, F(1, 60) = 70.74, p < .001, ηp
2 = .541. The Stroop effect was 
significantly larger in MCPRESENT (M = 163, SE = 7) than MCABSENT (M = 113, SE = 5), F(1, 60) = 
107.91, p < .001, ηp
2 = .643, whereas the Stroop effect was non-significantly smaller in 
MIPRESENT (M = 64, SE = 6) than in MIABSENT (M = 70, SE = 4), F(1, 60) = 2.43, p = .124, ηp
2 = 
.039. 
Diagnostic items. See Figure 2 for diagnostic phase results for reaction time and error 
rate. In order to assess the effects of the induction on Stroop performance independent of known 
confounds, the diagnostic phase was analyzed. There was a main effect of congruence, F(1, 60) = 
298.82, p <.001, ηp
2 = .833, such that responses to congruent trials (M = 620, SE = 12) were 
faster than incongruent trials (M = 697, SE = 13). The interaction between congruence and PC 
was significant (F(1, 60) = 20.16, p < .001, ηp
2 = .251), such that the Stroop effect was smaller in 
MC lists. However, this effect was qualified by a significant three-way interaction between 
congruence, PC, and window (F(1, 60) = 18.72, p < .001, ηp
2 = .238). Consistent with the 
predicted effects of the intermediate window, MCPRESENT (M = 62, SE = 5) had an attenuated 
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Stroop effect compared to MCABSENT (M = 78, SE = 6), F(1, 60) = 8.94, p = .004, ηp
2 = .130, 
whereas MIPRESENT (M = 93, SE = 6) had a larger Stroop effect than MIABSENT (M = 76, SE = 5), 
F(1, 60) = 8.95, p = .004, ηp
2 = .130. 
Finally, to assess whether results for diagnostic items were driven by a congruency 
sequence effect based on just the immediately preceding trial of the induction phase, I re-
analyzed performance in the diagnostic phase, excluding the first trial immediately following the 
induction (i.e., trial 19). The results converged with the above patterns: a significant main effect 
of congruence, F(1, 60) = 300.90, p < .001, ηp
2 = .834, such that responses to congruent trials (M 
= 617, SE = 12) were faster than incongruent trials (M = 696, SE = 13); a significant interaction 
between congruence and PC, F(1, 60) = 14.42, p < .001, ηp
2 = .194, such that the Stroop effect 
was larger in MI; and most critically, a significant three-way interaction between congruence, 
PC, and window, F(1, 60) = 8.15, p = .006, ηp
2 = .120. MCPRESENT (M = 64, SE = 5) had an 
attenuated Stroop effect compared to MCABSENT (M = 76, SE = 6), F(1, 60) = 4.13, p = .047, ηp
2 = 
.064, and MIPRESENT (M = 94, SE = 6) had a marginally larger Stroop effect than MIABSENT (M = 
81, SE = 6), F(1, 60) = 3.95, p = .051, ηp
2 = .062, although this difference was marginal. 
Error Rate 
 Induction items. There was a main effect of congruence, F(1, 60) = 64.86, p <.001, ηp
2 = 
.519, such that congruent trials (M = 0.55%, SE = 0.11%) were more accurate than incongruent 
trials (M = 4.70%, SE = 0.71%). The interaction between congruence and PC was significant 
(F(1, 60) = 39.15, p < .001, ηp
2 = .295) such that the Stroop effect was larger in MC inductions. 
Finally, the three-way interaction between congruence, PC, and window was significant, F(1, 60) 
= 12.93, p < .001, ηp
2 = .177. MCPRESENT (M = 7.02%, SE = 1.00%) had a larger Stroop effect 
than MCABSENT (M = 4.95%, SE = 0.64%), F(1, 60) = 8.42, p = .005, ηp
2 = .123. MIPRESENT (M = 
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1.85%, SE = 0.36%) had a smaller Stroop effect than MIABSENT (M = 2.82%, SE = 0.43%), F(1, 
60) = 8.39, p = .005, ηp
2 = .123. 
Diagnostic items. There was a main effect of congruence F(1, 60) = 57.67, p <.001, ηp
2 = 
.49, such that congruent trials (M = 0.59%, SE = 0.17%) were more accurate than incongruent 
trials (M = 4.01%, SE = 0.63%). The interactions between congruence and PC (F(1, 60) = 0.83, p 
= .367, ηp
2 = .014) and between congruence, PC, and window were non-significant, F(1, 60) = 
0.42, p = .521, ηp
2 = .007.  
Although there was no hint of an effect of the intermediate window in the performance on 
diagnostic trials, for completeness I performed the analysis excluding the first trial. This did not 
appreciably change any of the above patterns.  
Discussion 
One important goal of Experiment 1 was to understand whether evidence exists for an 
intermediate timescale of conflict accumulation controlling for the immediate and long 
timescales. Experiment 1 found that manipulating the presence or absence of an intermediate 
window in the induction phase affected cognitive control in the diagnostic phase. Incongruent 
windows in MCPRESENT lists attenuated the Stroop effect during the diagnostic phase in 
comparison to the MCABSENT lists; congruent windows in MIPRESENT lists exacerbated the Stroop 
effect during the diagnostic phase in comparison to MIABSENT lists. The divergent Stroop effects 
across conditions matched in PC but varying in the intermediate window experience (e.g., 
comparing MCABSENT and MCPRESENT) can be uniquely attributed to the manipulation in the 
intermediate timescale. The long timescale cannot explain the effect as the amount of conflict 
(i.e., frequency of congruent and incongruent trials) was equivalent between present and absent 
conditions. This result is consistent with findings demonstrating that relatively recent experience 
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is weighted more strongly than relatively distal experience in statistical models of adaptations to 
conflict (Aben et al., 2017; Dey, 2019). The statistical models also predicted that intermediate 
conflict experiences would have a larger effect in the MC conditions than in the MI conditions. 
Inconsistent with those models, the effect sizes were equivalent comparing differences in the 
diagnostic stage between MCPRESENT and MCABSENT and between MIPRESENT and MIABSENT. 
Based on these findings, Experiment 1 provides evidence of an effect of intermediate conflict 
experience on subsequent cognitive control that would not be predicted by the long timescale 
alone. However, it does not find evidence that the effect of intermediate timescale is modulated 
by the PC of the long timescale. 
Another goal of Experiment 1 was to see whether effects based on intermediate conflict 
would sustain over the course of the diagnostic phase. An analysis that accounted for the effect of 
the trial congruency immediately preceding the diagnostic phase was performed. That analysis 
found that the effect observed in the diagnostic phase was not driven by differences in the 
immediate timescale. This demonstrates evidence for a sustained adjustment in control following 
the manipulation in the intermediate timescale. 
Although the induction phase (long timescale) was equivalent between MCPRESENT and 
MCABSENT and between MIPRESENT and MIABSENT conditions in that an equal number of congruent 
and incongruent trials were presented, performances in the induction phase differed. Stroop 
effects were significantly larger in MCPRESENT than MCABSENT for RT and error rate, and smaller 
in MIPRESENT than MIABSENT for error rate (but equivalent in RT). This is clearly surprising from a 
frequency perspective. One might be concerned that differences in the induction phase limit 
conclusions that can be drawn about the critical comparisons from the diagnostic phase 
(MCPRESENT vs. MCABSENT, and MIPRESENT vs. MIABSENT). However, the key question I aimed to 
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address regarding the diagnostic phase concerned whether the intermediate timescale in the 
induction had a unique effect on subsequent performance. The differences in Stroop performance 
in the diagnostic phase (i.e., Stroop effects were smaller in MCPRESENT than MCABSENT and larger 
in MIPRESENT than MIABSENT) indicate that some element of the induction experience affected 
cognitive control during the diagnostic phase. Given the differing patterns observed for the 
induction phase and the diagnostic phase, it can be certain that participants did not simply extend 
the global control setting that was in effect during the 18-trial induction phase. Instead, these 
patterns imply that the entire induction experience was not being weighted equally from the 19th 
trial onward in the diagnostic phase, which is consistent with the conclusion that the intermediate 
window had a unique and influential effect on diagnostic phase performance. Said differently, the 
elements of the induction that drove the patterns of performance during induction trials were not 
identical to the elements of the induction (i.e., the window) that primarily drove diagnostic trial 
performance.  
 Although the three-way interaction, and the specific direction of the performance 
advantages observed in the critical comparisons (MCABSENT vs. MCPRESENT, and MIABSENT vs. 
MIPRESENT) were anticipated assuming an effect of the intermediate timescale, one unanticipated 
finding was that a list-wide PC effect was not observed when comparing MCABSENT and 
MIABSENT lists (i.e., Stroop effect is typically larger in the MC condition). This stands in contrast 
to prior studies that found a list-wide PC effect for diagnostic items (e.g., Bugg, 2014; Bugg & 
Chanani, 2011; Cohen-Shikora et al., 2018; Gonthier, Braver, & Bugg, 2016; Hutchison, 2011). 
A methodological consideration is that the diagnostic trials occurred in a separate phase at the 
end of each list. This design was chosen in order to assess whether the cognitive control 
adjustments would sustain over the course of several trials following the intermediate conflict 
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manipulation. In all prior studies, diagnostic trials were randomly intermixed with induction 
trials throughout the list. It is possible that this difference may have affected how induced 
cognitive control settings manifested on diagnostic trials. To evaluate this possibility, an 
exploratory analysis was performed on the Diagnostic Set trials that were integrated in the first 
14 trials of the lists and not included in the analysis of the induction phase. These Diagnostic Set 
trials, like those in the diagnostic phase, were 50% congruent and comprised of unique 
colors/words from induction trials; however, and most critically for present purposes, these 
Diagnostic Set trials were intermixed among the induction phase trials and thus comparable to 
diagnostic trials in prior studies. This analysis revealed significant differences in the Stroop 
effect for diagnostic trials consistent with the PC of the induction (i.e., typical list-wide PC 
effects).3 
In summary, Experiment 1 provided initial evidence that the intermediate timescale of 
conflict accumulation influences cognitive control independent of other timescales. However, 
there may be boundary conditions for this effect. For example, in Experiment 1, the intermediate 
timescale was strongly “experience defying” in that the window was comprised entirely of the 
type of trial participants rarely experienced before the window (e.g., a window of incongruent 
trials in an MC list). As such, in present lists, the intermediate conflict experience differed 
markedly from the preceding experience (e.g., shift from 93% congruent pre-window to 0% 
congruent during the window in MCPRESENT induction). Given this rather extreme shift, conflict 
experiences within the window may have been quite salient and driven adjustments in attention. 
 
3 The analysis assessed the reaction time for Diagnostic Set trials that were integrated into the pre-window section of 
the induction. There was a significant main effect of congruence (F(1 ,60) = 178.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .749) and a 
significant main effect of condition type (F(3, 180) = 7.88, p < .001, ηp2 =.116). Importantly, there was a significant 
interaction between congruence and condition (F(3, 180) = 7.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .118) such that the size of Stroop 
Effect was in accordance with the PC in the pre-window section of each condition (MCPRESENT = 88; MCABSENT = 
74; MIABSENT = 63; MIPRESENT = 43). Note the limited power, as there was only one congruent and one incongruent 




Experiment 2 aimed to assess the possibility that the effects of the intermediate timescale 
depend on the experience within that timescale strongly defying experience in the long timescale. 
One theoretical possibility is that defiance of experience generates a prediction error (e.g., den 
Ouden, Kok, & de Lange, 2012) as such errors have been shown to be consequential in 
producing adjustments to cognitive control (Brown & Braver, 2005; Alexander & Brown, 2011). 
To address this possibility, Experiment 2 manipulated conflict in the intermediate timescale while 
reducing the magnitude of the prediction error between the pre-window and the window of the 
induction. As in Experiment 1, each list was comprised of an induction phase followed by a 
diagnostic phase. However, in Experiment 2, the induction phase prior to the window was always 
50% congruent. Again, the last four trials of the induction phase (i.e., window) were manipulated 
such that the window was entirely congruent, entirely incongruent, or unbiased (50% congruent).  
The manipulation in Experiment 2 was employed to examine whether the effect of the 
intermediate timescale depends on the level of conflict experienced during the long timescale. In 
Experiment 1, the experience within the window strongly defied previous experience. For 
example, an entirely incongruent window in Experiment 1 (see Figure 1 panel A) represented a 
shift from 93% congruent pre-window to 0% congruent during the window in MCPRESENT 
induction. In comparison, the experience within the window in Experiment 2 defied previous 
experience comparatively weakly. An entirely incongruent window in Experiment 2 (see Figure 
1 panel B) represented a shift from 50% congruent pre-window to 0% congruent during the 
window in the condition with an incongruent window. The diagnostic phase was identical to 
Experiment 1. Therefore, this experiment again had the opportunity to inform the theoretical 
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question of whether effects of the intermediate timescale are transient or more sustained (across 
multiple trials). 
If the effect of intermediate conflict does not depend on defying the long timescale, one 
would predict that the window section of the induction should drive subsequent cognitive 
control. That is, the congruent window will accentuate the congruency effect (and the 
incongruent window will attenuate the congruency effect) in the diagnostic phase relative to 
other conditions. Statistically, this would manifest as an interaction between congruence and 
window type during the diagnostic phase. Alternatively, if the effects of conflict accumulation in 
the intermediate timescale rely on strongly defying previous experience, given that there is 
objectively weaker defiance in Experiment 2, one would not predict a difference between the 
three conditions. Alternatively, the difference may be smaller. Statistically, there would be a non-
significant interaction between congruence and window type.  
Method 
Participants. Sixty-two Washington University undergraduates (43 female, Age M = 
20.03, SD = 1.43) participated for course credit. All participants were native English speakers 
with normal or corrected vision and color vision. One participant was excluded for falling asleep 
during the task, and one participant was excluded for difficulty using the microphone. Therefore, 
60 were included in the reported analysis (42 female, Age M = 20.05, SD = 1.43). 
Design and Stimuli. As in Experiment 1, each list was comprised of an induction phase 
and a diagnostic phase (see Figure 1) and the induction and diagnostic sets were identical to 
Experiment 1. The pre-window section of the induction phase began with a pseudo-randomly 
ordered set of seven congruent and seven incongruent trials. Therefore, the pre-window section 
of the induction was unbiased (i.e., 50% congruent). I manipulated conflict in the four-trial 
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window at the end of the induction phase (0% congruent, 50% congruent, or 100% congruent). 
Contrasting Experiment 1, this meant that the long timescale was not equivalent across 
conditions (induction phases were 61.11%, 50%, and 38.88% in the congruent, unbiased, and 
incongruent window conditions, respectively); this experimental control was sacrificed in order 
to manipulate the intermediate timescale while holding experience preceding the manipulation 
constant. The diagnostic phase was equivalent to Experiment 1.  
There were 44 lists in the experiment including 12 lists for each of the following: 
unbiased with congruent window, unbiased with unbiased window, and unbiased with 
incongruent window. Additionally, there were eight filler lists. Again, the order of the trials 
within the lists was pseudorandom and fixed to maintain the manipulation. The order in which 
the 44 lists were presented was random.  
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with the exception that there 
were 44 lists of 26 trials.  
Results 
0.85% of trials were removed from the RT trim. All analyses used a 2 x 3 repeated 
measures ANOVA with factors of congruence (congruent or incongruent) and window type 
(100% congruent, 50% congruent, or 0% congruent). See Table 2 for descriptive statistics. Only 
theoretically relevant inferential statistics are reported; comprehensive analyses are reported in 
Table 4. Post-hoc t values apply a Holm Bonferroni correction (Holm, 1979). 
Reaction Time 
Induction items. As in Experiment 1, induction analysis included the 14 pre-window 
trials and the four trials in the window. There was a significant main effect of congruence, F(1, 
59) = 242.68, p < .001, ηp
2 = .804, such that responses to congruent trials (M = 614, SE = 12) 
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were faster than incongruent trials (M = 719, SE = 15). There was a significant main effect of 
window, F(2, 118) = 3.48, p = .034, ηp
2 = .056, such that performance during an induction with a 
100% congruent window (M = 662, SE = 16) was marginally faster than during an induction with 
a 50% congruent window (M = 668, SE = 16, t = 2.043, p = .09) and significantly faster than 
with a 100% incongruent window (M = 669, SE = 15, t = 2.49, p = .047); performance during 
inductions with 50% congruent and incongruent windows did not differ, (t = 0.55, p = .58). There 
was a non-significant interaction between window and congruence, F(2, 118) = 0.13, p = .876, 
ηp
2 = .002, such that the Stroop effects did not differ across conditions.  
Diagnostic items. There was a significant main effect of congruence, F(1, 59) = 99.77, p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .628, such that responses to congruent trials (M = 629, SE = 13) were faster than 
incongruent trials (M = 724, SE = 18). There was a significant main effect of window, F(2, 118) 
= 3.39 , p = .037, ηp
2 = .054, such that responses following a congruent window (M = 671, SE 
=17) were non-significantly faster than performance following an unbiased window (M = 674, 
SE =16) , t = 1.95, p = .111, and were significantly faster than responses following an 
incongruent window (M = 683, SE = 17), t = 2.48, p = .048). Performances following a 
congruent window or an unbiased window did not differ, t = 0.64, p = .526. There was a non-
significant interaction of window and congruence, F(2, 118) = 0.42, p = .420, ηp
2 = .658, as 
Stroop effects did not differ across conditions. 
Although there was no hint of an effect of the intermediate window in the performance on 
diagnostic trials, for completeness I report the analysis excluding the first trial in the diagnostic 
phase. Again, there was a significant main effect of congruence, F(1, 59) = 100.21, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .629, such that responses to congruent trials (M = 624, SE = 13) were more accurate than 
incongruent trials (M = 721, SE = 18). However, the main effect of window was no longer 
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significant, F(2, 118) = 1.93, p = .149, ηp
2 = .032. The interaction of window and congruence 
remained non-significant, F(2, 118) = 1.38, p = .256, ηp
2 = .023.  
Error Rate 
Induction items. There was a significant main effect of congruence, F(1, 59) = 74.51, p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .558, such that responses to congruent trials (M = 0.57%, SE = 0.12%) were more 
accurate than incongruent trials (M = 4.01%, SE = 0.45%). There was a non-significant main 
effect of window, F(2, 118) = 0.46, p = .630, ηp
2 = .008. There was a significant interaction of 
window and congruence, F(2, 118) = 4.30, p = .016, ηp
2 = .068, such that the Stroop effect was 
smaller in the congruent window condition (M = 2.17%, SE = 0.41%) than incongruent window 
(M = 2.35%, SE = 0.51%) and unbiased window (M = 2.35%, SE = 0.48%) conditions. 
Diagnostic items. There was a significant main effect of congruence, F(1, 59) = 47.96, p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .448, such that responses to congruent trials (M = 0.51%, SE = 0.16%) were more 
accurate than incongruent trials (M = 4.18%, SE = 0.65%). There was a significant main effect of 
window, F(2, 118) = 6.41, p = .002, ηp
2 = .098, such that performance following an induction 
with a congruent window (M = 3.03%, SE = 0.60%) was less accurate than an unbiased window 
(M = 2.09%, SE = 0.51%), t = 2.91, p = .011, or an incongruent window (M = 1.92%, SE = 
0.46%), t = 3.02, p = .011. Performance did not differ following an induction with an unbiased 
window and an incongruent window, t = 0.57, p = .572. There was a significant interaction effect 
between window and congruence, F(2, 118) = 5.06, p = .008, ηp
2 = .079, such that the Stroop 
effect was smallest following an induction with an incongruent window (M = 2.93%, SE = 
0.59%), then a congruent window, (M = 3.2%, SE = 0.72%) and the unbiased window (M = 
3.53%, SE = 0.63%). 
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In the diagnostic phase, excluding the first trial, there was a significant main effect of 
congruence, F(1, 59) = 43.44, p < .001, ηp
2 = .424, such that responses to congruent trials (M = 
0.46%, SE = 0.16%) were more accurate than incongruent trials (M = 4.13%, SE = 0.68%). There 
was a significant main effect of window, F(2, 118) = 3.30, p = .040, ηp
2 = .053; however, 
performance following an induction with a congruent window (M = 2.80%, SE = 0.60%) was 
non-significantly less accurate than performance following an unbiased window (M = 2.15%, SE 
= 0.55%), t = 2.14, p = .103, or an incongruent window (M = 1.95%, SE = 0.49%), t = 2.16, p = 
.103. Performance also did not differ between unbiased and incongruent conditions, t = 0.49, p = 
.623. There was now a non-significant interaction of window and congruence, F(2, 118) = 2.14, 
p = .123, ηp
2 = .035.  
Discussion 
The key finding of Experiment 2 was that Stroop performance did not differ among 
conditions during the diagnostic phase. Recall that Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were similar 
in their manipulation of the intermediate timescale (i.e., four-trial windows that were entirely 
congruent or entirely incongruent at the end of the induction phase) but differed in the pre-
window section of the induction. The window section of the induction strongly defied the pre-
window section in Experiment 1 and weakly defied the pre-window section in Experiment 2. Put 
simply, the same intermediate conflict manipulation that was effective in modulating control in 
Experiment 1 (i.e., presentation of four consecutive congruent or incongruent trials) did not 
affect cognitive control in Experiment 2. I interpret this to mean that if the conflict in the 
intermediate timescale sufficiently defies previous experience (as set by the induction trials), 
then conflict information in the intermediate timescale may be salient and weighted more 
strongly than distal conflict information. Prediction error potentially serves an important role as a 
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signal to weight new information preferentially. If a large prediction error occurs, then conflict 
experiences in the intermediate timescale may be signaled as important and thus affect control; 
however, if no or small prediction error occurs, then conflict in the intermediate timescale may 
not be signaled as particularly important. Although it remains to be determined what constitutes 
“sufficiently” defying experience or a sufficiently large prediction error, this result demonstrates 
a boundary condition of the influence of intermediate conflict experiences on cognitive control. 
The results in Experiment 2 may be surprising when compared to studies that 
manipulated conflict experiences several trials before the diagnostic trial (e.g., Durston et al., 
2003; Horga et al., 2011; Jiménez & Méndez, 2013; Jiménez & Méndez, 2014). Those studies 
used 50% congruent lists and found that cognitive control varied as a function of the amount of 
conflict experienced on several preceding trials. One might expect that because Experiment 2 
used a similar manipulation to those previous studies (i.e., a window of 4 congruent trials or a 
window of 4 incongruent trials preceded by 50% congruent trials), then a difference between 
conditions should have been observed during the diagnostic phase. The results in Experiment 2 
are not necessarily inconsistent with the aforementioned studies, however, because of two 
important methodological differences. First, the diagnostic trials in Experiment 2 were from the 
Diagnostic Set, and they were therefore a different color and word than any trial experienced in 
the window. To observe an effect on these trials, adjustments in control had to be sufficiently 
abstract to extend from the induction to new stimulus features in the diagnostic phase. That was 
not the case in the prior studies where diagnostic trials comprised the same features as the 
preceding inducer trials. Second, Experiment 2 considered a larger diagnostic scope (n + 8 trials) 
than prior studies (n + 1 trial). To know whether a similar effect was found in Experiment 2 as 
the prior studies, one would determine whether there was evidence for an effect of the 
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immediately preceding trial on the first trial of the diagnostic phase in Experiment 2. Some 
evidence exists for an effect of intermediate conflict. Specifically, reaction time was slower 
overall following the incongruent window in the diagnostic phase and error rate was significantly 
higher following a congruent window in the diagnostic phase but neither effect remained after 
removing the first trial of the diagnostic phase. This suggests much of these observed effects 
could be alternatively explained by congruency sequence effects following the final trial of 
induction.  
General Discussion 
While previous work documenting the effects of conflict experiences on cognitive control 
adaptation has mostly been limited to effects of the previous trial (immediate timescale) and 
effects of the entire block (long timescale), I aimed to examine the effects of relatively recent 
experience (intermediate timescale). To that end, two primary questions were addressed: what 
evidence exists for an intermediate timescale on its own or in interaction with other timescales 
and do effects from the intermediate timescale sustain over several trials? Evidence for those 
questions is hereafter discussed. Following that, I will discuss potential explanations and their 
theoretical implications, examine limitations for the study, and explore future directions for this 
research. 
 Evaluation of Study Goals 
The first goal was to understand whether there is, as suggested by a number of behavioral 
studies (e.g., Durston et al., 2003; Horga et al., 2011; Jiménez & Méndez, 2013; Jiménez & 
Méndez, 2014) and existing statistical models (Aben et al., 2017; Dey 2019), evidence for an 
intermediate timescale and to examine whether the effect of conflict experiences in the 
intermediate timescale depends on other timescales. Experiment 1, controlling for conflict 
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experiences in the long and immediate timescales, found a unique effect of conflict in the 
intermediate timescale. In MC lists, presenting a run of four incongruent trials at the end of the 
induction led to an attenuated Stroop effect in the diagnostic phase; in MI lists, presenting four 
congruent trials at the end of the induction led to a larger Stroop effect in the diagnostic phase. 
Strikingly, when comparing MCPRESENT to MIPRESENT lists, conflict experiences in the 
intermediate timescale led to a reversal of the standard list-wide PC effect such that the Stroop 
effect was smaller in MC than MI lists. Contrasting Experiment 1, Experiment 2 used an 
unbiased pre-window section of the induction before the intermediate conflict manipulations. In 
Experiment 2, conflict in the intermediate timescale did not affect Stroop performance in the 
diagnostic phase. Taking both experiments into account, it can be concluded that evidence exists 
for an effect of conflict accumulation in the intermediate timescale that plausibly depends on the 
preceding conflict experiences in the long timescale. However, in opposition to the findings in 
statistical models examining timescales of control (Aben et al., 2017; Dey, 2019), there was not a 
stronger effect of the intermediate timescale (i.e., relatively recent experience) in MC lists than 
MI lists. The current effect may be driven by defying previous experiences rather than the overall 
conflict level in the previous experience. 
The second primary goal was to understand whether effects from the intermediate 
timescale sustain across a longer diagnostic phase. In comparison to previous studies (e.g., 
Durston et al., 2003; Horga et al., 2011; Jiménez & Méndez, 2013; Jiménez & Méndez, 2014) 
that examined conflict experiences more distally than the immediately preceding trial, 
Experiments 1 and 2 broadened the understanding of the effects of intermediate conflict by 
widening the diagnostic scope beyond a single subsequent trial to a phase of eight subsequent 
trials. In Experiment 1, the intermediate conflict manipulation had an effect on the diagnostic 
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trials which remained significant after removing the first trial of the diagnostic phase. Although 
future research is needed to confirm this pattern, it suggests a potentially interesting difference 
between the intermediate and immediate timescale. The latter is typically thought to produce a 
transient effect (as indicated by studies examining the congruency sequence effect) but the 
results from Experiment 1 suggest that that effects of intermediate conflict extend beyond the 
trial immediately following the manipulation to other trials in the eight-trial diagnostic phase. 
Experiment 2 did not find an effect of intermediate conflict. Therefore, no evidence can be drawn 
regarding whether an effect was sustained or transient.  
Potential Explanations 
Though both experiments manipulated the experience of conflict in the intermediate 
timescale, only in Experiment 1 did the Stroop effect in the diagnostic phase depend on conflict 
in the intermediate timescale. One potential explanation considers whether it is necessary for 
conflict experiences in the intermediate timescale to produce a prediction error in order for these 
experiences to affect control. It is possible that such an error occurred in Experiment 1 but not 
Experiment 2 given that conflict experiences in the intermediate timescale were likely more 
salient in Experiment 1 because of the degree to which they defied prior experience in the lists. 
This salience may have increased the weighting of that information in the intermediate timescale. 
If the intermediate conflict was less salient in Experiment 2, it was also plausibly weighted less 
strongly, encouraging the participant to weight all experiences acquired in the list relatively 
equally. This difference would explain the significant interaction in Experiment 1 and the non-
significant interaction in Experiment 2 for reaction time in diagnostic trials.  
A second potential explanation interprets the results from the perspective of the volatility 
modelling framework (Jiang, Heller, & Egner, 2014). In comparison to the fixed learning rate 
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assumed in the conflict monitoring account, the volatility model incorporates flexible changes in 
learning rate as a function of volatility, (i.e., the likelihood that conflict is relatively consistent or 
fluctuates over the course of several trials; Jiang et al., 2014). When volatility is high, the 
learning rate is also high and accordingly, more recent information (i.e., trials that have been 
recently experienced) is weighted more strongly when informing whether attention should be 
heightened or relaxed. When volatility is low, learning rate is low and a larger window of 
(preceding) trials is used to inform cognitive control adaptations. By accounting for the amount 
of trials that are weighted to inform attentional settings, the volatility model is capable of 
forming hypotheses about effects on an intermediate timescale that depend on conflict 
experiences in the long timescale.  
Interpreting these results from the volatility model’s perspective, Experiment 1 is 
considerably volatile on a list level (take MCPRESENT for example, where participants shift from 
MC in the induction to entirely incongruent in the intermediate window to unbiased in the 
diagnostic phase) and on an experimental level (shifting from MC to MI to Unbiased lists 
randomly). Experiment 2 is less volatile on a list level (unbiased, shifting to a biased or unbiased 
window, shifting to unbiased) and on an experiment level (most lists are unbiased or close to 
unbiased). If learning rate increases with increased volatility and a higher learning rate leads to 
stronger weighting of more recent trials (Jiang, Beck, Heller, & Egner, 2015), then Experiment 1 
should have been more likely to yield an effect of the intermediate conflict. Consistent with this 
model, it did. Interestingly this model also predicted the lack of an asymmetrical effect of 
intermediate conflict depending on the long timescale (MC vs. MI) in Experiment 1. MCPRESENT 
and MIPRESENT lists were equivalently volatile to each other; thus, according to the volatility 
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model, the lists should have encouraged participants to use an equivalent amount of the 
intermediate information in each list. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Several limitations merit further discussion. One is the conceptualization of relatively 
recent experience as a four-trial window of conflict. This number was chosen because prior 
behavioral studies had included examination of four previous trials (e.g., Durston et al., 2003; 
Horga et al., 2011; Jiménez & Méndez, 2013; Jiménez & Méndez, 2014) and prior modelling 
efforts found an effect of conflict at least four trials prior (Aben et al., 2017). To fully understand 
the effects of conflict on the intermediate timescale, future research should examine different 
window lengths. In addition, future research should also consider whether a window of a given 
length (e.g., four trials) may have a different effect on control depending on the length of the pre-
window induction, that is, whether the relative size of the window matters or just the absolute 
size. It is possible that effects of manipulations on the intermediate timescale depend on what 
proportion of the overall experience the intermediate conflict comprises.  
In comparing the results of this study to previous work, some consideration should be 
given to two key design choices: the abbreviated lists paradigm and the conceptualization of 
intermediate conflict. While these design choices were chosen to fulfill goals of the study, 
comparing results across studies should account for these methodological differences. The 
abbreviated-lists paradigm was used to control for the long and intermediate timescales in each 
list, while still achieving enough observations for diagnostic trials. Abbreviated lists allow for 
more lists to be seen by each participant, thus allowing for sufficient observations for each 
condition. Note that the statistical modelling papers that provided initial evidence for the 
intermediate timescale (Aben et al., 2017; Dey 2019) were based on longer lists (lists ranged 
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from 160 to 480 trials). It is possible that when the long timescale is based on a longer history of 
trials then its influence on subsequent cognitive control changes. Another important difference 
between this study and previous modelling efforts was the choice of manipulating intermediate 
conflict experiences as runs of four trials of the same trial type. The statistical models (Aben et 
al., 2017; Dey 2019) were based on naturally occurring sequences and examined the effect of 
conflict experiences on the trials preceding the n trial. While it is possible that some runs of four 
trials occurred in those lists, the effect of a conflict experience on the fourth trial before trial n 
does not necessitate that all four trials preceding trial n were the same trial type (congruency). A 
primary goal of this study was to find an effect of the intermediate timescale if such an effect 
exists; it is likely that manipulating the four trials to be entirely congruent (or entirely 
incongruent) represents an extreme case of an intermediate conflict experience. 
An important consideration in the results of Experiment 1 is the absence of an asymmetry 
between MC and MI conditions during the diagnostic phase. For reference, an asymmetrical 
pattern would mean that the effect of the intermediate conflict manipulation was larger in the MC 
condition than in the MI condition (e.g., Abrahamse, Duthoo, & Notebaert, 2013), as observed in 
Aben et al., (2017; see also Dey, 2019). An important difference in design regards the presence 
and placement of diagnostic trials. The effects modelled by Aben et al., (2017) included only 
biased trials; the list-wide PC effects in Dey (2019) included biased induction trials intermixed 
with unbiased diagnostic trials. In Experiment 1 of this study, diagnostic trials were presented in 
a separate phase following induction. The lack of asymmetry in the diagnostic phase for 
Experiment 1 may therefore not be inconsistent with these models, as they do not model solely 
diagnostic trials in a list-wide manipulation. 
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Some theoretical consideration should be given to the surprising result in Experiment 1 
that the manipulation of intermediate conflict produced a “reversed” list-wide PC effect 
comparing MCPRESENT and MIPRESENT lists. That is, experiencing an MC list ending with four 
incongruent trials led to a smaller Stroop effect in the diagnostic phase than experiencing an 
entirely MI list (i.e., MIABSENT). Likewise, experiencing an MI list ending with four congruent 
trials led to a larger Stroop effect in the diagnostic phase than an entirely MC list (i.e., 
MCABSENT). This finding may speak to the relative strength of conflict in the intermediate 
timescale. While previous work has shown that list-wide PC effects are dissociable from 
congruency sequence effects and are not just by an accumulation of immediate timescale 
adaptations (Torres-Quesada et al., 2013; Torres-Quesada et al., 2014), no research has assessed 
whether list-wide PC effects are made up of intermediate effects. Simply put, it is possible that 
list-wide PC effects are driven by several preceding trials rather than whole lists. If adjustments 
to cognitive control based on intermediate conflict experiences are more sustained than those 
from the immediate timescale, as the findings of Experiment 1 imply, then intermediate 
experiences may more plausibly drive list-wide PC effects. 
Another limitation of the approach in the current studies is in Experiment 1, PC was held 
constant across inductions while conflict in the window section of the induction phase was 
manipulated. Therefore, present and absent lists in Experiment 1 also differed in how much 
conflict was experienced in the beginning of the induction. It is possible that the initial 
experiences in a list, rather than the lists differing at the end of the induction phase, drove 
differences between conditions in the diagnostic phase. Experiment 2 did not differ in the early 
lists, and significant differences were not observed between conditions in the diagnostic phase. 
However, this explanation is inconsistent with previous findings that people flexibly adjust 
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control based on later experiences following conflict experienced at the beginning of a list 
(Cohen-Shikora et al., 2018). 
It is likely the case that many factors contribute to the amount of trials that are 
represented in the intermediate timescale such as the PC of the overall list (Aben et al., 2017) 
and the volatility both within a list and experiment-wide (Jiang et al., 2014). At the same time, 
experimental manipulations that affect prediction error or the salience of the intermediate 
timescale may modulate its influence on control. Additionally, individual differences, such as 
working memory capacity, may contribute to how many trials are represented within this 
timescale. Individuals with a larger working memory capacity may maintain and use conflict 
experiences that occur more trials back than those with low working memory capacity.  
Conclusion 
The present study demonstrated a unique effect of relatively recent conflict experiences on 
cognitive control, further suggesting the importance of the intermediate timescale. The present 
study also provided initial support for the possibility that this effect of recent conflict experiences 
may depend in part on whether recent experiences are inconsistent with previous experiences. 
Given that effects from the intermediate timescale were seen in the diagnostic phase after 
controlling for the effect of the immediate timescale at the beginning of the diagnostic phase, 
there is evidence that conflict experiences in the intermediate timescale affect control in a 
sustained fashion. Further research should continue to consider whether certain conflict 
experiences are more influential than others in terms of informing how people attend to and 
resolve subsequent conflict. The results reported in this study demonstrate that theories of 
cognitive control should consider the role of conflict experienced in the intermediate timescale, 
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as it could lead to a better understanding of how previous conflict experiences are weighted and 




Aben, B., Verguts, T., & Van den Bussche, E. (2017). Beyond trial-by-trial adaptation: A 
 quantification of the time scale of cognitive control. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
 Human Perception and Performance, 43(3), 509, doi:10.1037/xhp0000324 
Abrahamse, E. L., Duthoo, W., Notebaert, W., & Risko, E. F. (2013). Attention modulation by 
 proportion congruency: The asymmetrical list shifting effect. Journal of Experimental 
 Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39(5), 1552, doi:10.1037/a0032426 
Alexander, W. H., & Brown, J. W. (2011). Medial prefrontal cortex as an action-outcome 
 predictor. Nature Neuroscience, 14(10), 1338, doi:10.1038/nn.2921 
Behrens, T. E., Woolrich, M. W., Walton, M. E., & Rushworth, M. F. (2007). Learning the value 
 of information in an uncertain world. Nature Neuroscience, 10(9), 1214, 
 doi:10.1038/nn1954 
Blais, C., Robidoux, S., Risko, E. F., and Besner, D. (2007). Item-specific adaptation and the 
 conflict monitoring hypothesis: a computational model. Psychological Review 114, 1076–
 1086, doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.114.4.1076 
Braver, T. S., Gray, J. R., & Burgess, G. C. (2007). Explaining the many varieties of working 
 memory variation: Dual mechanisms of cognitive control. Variation in working 
 memory, 75, 106. 
Braem, S., Bugg, J. M., Schmidt, J. R., Crump, M. J., Weissman, D. H., Notebaert, W., & Egner, 
 T. (2019). Measuring adaptive control in conflict tasks. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 
Brown, J. W., & Braver, T. S. (2005). Learned predictions of error likelihood in the anterior 
 cingulate cortex. Science, 307(5712), 1118-1121, doi:10.1126/science.1105783 
34 
 
Bugg, J. M. (2017). Context, conflict, and control. In T. Egner (Ed.), The Wiley handbook of 
 cognitive control (pp. 79 –96). Chichester, UK: Wiley.  
Bugg, J. M. (2012). Dissociating levels of cognitive control: The case of Stroop 
 interference. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21(5), 302-309,  
doi: 10.1177/0963721412453586 
Bugg, J. M., & Chanani, S. (2011). List-wide control is not entirely elusive: Evidence from 
 picture–word Stroop. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 18(5), 930-936, 
 doi:10.3758/s13423-011-0112-y 
Bugg, J. M., & Crump, M. J. (2012). In support of a distinction between voluntary and stimulus-
 driven control: A review of the literature on proportion congruent effects. Frontiers in 
 Psychology, 3, 367, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00367 
Bugg, J. M., Diede, N. T., Cohen-Shikora, E. R., & Selmeczy, D. (2015). Expectations and 
 experience: Dissociable bases for cognitive control? Journal of Experimental 
 Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41(5), 1349, doi:10.1037/xlm0000106 
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). Conflict 
 monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological Review, 108(3), 624,  
doi:10.1037//0033-295X.108.3.624 
Cohen, J. D. (2017). Cognitive Control: Core Constructions and Current Considerations. In T. 
 Egner (Ed.), The Wiley handbook of cognitive control. (pp. 17-41). Chichester, West 
 Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons 
Cohen-Shikora, E. R., Diede, N. T., & Bugg, J. M. (2018). The flexibility of cognitive control: 




Crump, M. J., & Milliken, B. (2009). The flexibility of context-specific control: Evidence for 
 context-driven generalization of item-specific control settings. The Quarterly Journal of 
 Experimental Psychology, 62(8), 1523-1532, doi:10.1080/17470210902752096 
Den Ouden, H. E., Kok, P., & De Lange, F. P. (2012). How prediction errors shape perception, 
 attention, and motivation. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 548, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00548 
Dey, Abhishek, "Learning from Past Conflict: Investigating the Time Scale of Conflict Learning 
 for Cognitive Control Processes" (2019). Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and 
 Dissertations. 1755. 
Durston, S., Davidson, M. C., Thomas, K. M., Worden, M. S., Tottenham, N., Martinez, A., ... & 
 Casey, B. J. (2003). Parametric manipulation of conflict and response competition using 
 rapid mixed-trial event-related fMRI. Neuroimage, 20(4), 2135-2141, 
 doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2003.08.004 
Duthoo, W., Abrahamse, E. L., Braem, S., Boehler, C. N., & Notebaert, W. (2014). The 
 heterogeneous world of congruency sequence effects: An update. Frontiers in 
 Psychology, 5, 1001, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01001 
Duthoo, W., Abrahamse, E. L., Braem, S., & Notebaert, W. (2014). Going, going, gone? 
 Proactive control prevents the congruency sequence effect from rapid 
 decay. Psychological Research, 78(4), 483-493, doi:10.1007/s00426-013-0498-4 
Egner, T. (2007). Congruency sequence effects and cognitive control. Cognitive, Affective, & 
 Behavioral Neuroscience, 7(4), 380-390, doi:10.3758/CABN.7.4.380 
Egner, T., Ely, S., & Grinband, J. (2010). Going, going, gone: characterizing the time-course of 




Egner, T., & Hirsch, J. (2005). Cognitive control mechanisms resolve conflict through cortical 
 amplification of task-relevant information. Nature Neuroscience, 8(12), 1784, 
 doi:10.1038/nn1594 
Gonthier, C., Braver, T. S., & Bugg, J. M. (2016). Dissociating proactive and reactive control in 
 the Stroop task. Memory & Cognition, 44(5), 778-788, doi:10.3758/s13421-016-0591-1 
Gratton, G., Coles, M. G., & Donchin, E. (1992). Optimizing the use of information: strategic 
 control of activation of responses. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 121(4), 
 480, doi:10.1037/0096-3445.121.4.480 
Holm, S. (1979). A simple sequentially rejective multiple test procedure. Scandinavian Journal 
 of Statistics, 65-70. 
Horga, G., Maia, T. V., Wang, P., Wang, Z., Marsh, R., & Peterson, B. S. (2011). Adaptation to 
 conflict via context-driven anticipatory signals in the dorsomedial prefrontal 
 cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 31(45), 16208-16216,  
 doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2783-11.2011 
Hutchison, K. A. (2011). The interactive effects of listwide control, item-based control, and 
 working memory capacity on Stroop performance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
 Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37(4), 851, doi:10.1037/a0023437 
Jiménez, L., & Méndez, A. (2013). It is not what you expect: Dissociating conflict adaptation 
 from expectancies in a Stroop task. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
 Perception and Performance, 39(1), 271, doi:10.1037/a0027734 
Jiménez, L., & Méndez, A. (2014). Even with time, conflict adaptation is not made of 
 expectancies. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1042, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01042 
37 
 
Jiang, J., Beck, J., Heller, K., & Egner, T. (2015). An insula-frontostriatal network mediates 
 flexible cognitive control by adaptively predicting changing control demands. Nature 
 Communications, 6, 8165, doi:10.1038/ncomms9165 
Jiang, J., Heller, K., & Egner, T. (2014). Bayesian modeling of flexible cognitive 
 control. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 46, 30-43, 
 doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.06.001 
Logan, G. D., & Zbrodoff, N. J. (1979). When it helps to be misled: Facilitative effects of 
 increasing the frequency of conflicting stimuli in a Stroop-like task. Memory & 
 Cognition, 7(3), 166-174, doi:10.3758/BF03197535 
Meier, M. E., & Kane, M. J. (2013). Working memory capacity and Stroop interference: Global 
 versus local indices of executive control. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
 Memory, and Cognition, 39(3), 748, doi:10.1037/a0029200 
Schlaghecken, F., & Martini, P. (2012). Context, not conflict, drives cognitive control. Journal of 
 Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 38(2), 272, 
 doi:10.1037/a0025791 
Schmidt, J. R., & Besner, D. (2008). The Stroop effect: why proportion congruent has nothing to 
 do with congruency and everything to do with contingency. Journal of Experimental 
 Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34(3), 514,  
doi:10.1037/0278-7393.34.3.514 
Torres-Quesada, M., Funes, M. J., & Lupiáñez, J. (2013). Dissociating proportion congruent and 
 conflict adaptation effects in a Simon–Stroop procedure. Acta Psychologica, 142(2), 203-
 210, doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.11.015 
38 
 
Torres-Quesada, M., Milliken, B., Lupiáñez, J., & Funes, M. J. (2014). Proportion Congruent 
 effects in the absence of Sequential Congruent effects. Psicológica, 35(1), 101-115. 
Verguts, T., & Notebaert, W. (2008). Hebbian learning of cognitive control: dealing with specific 



















Figure 1. List composition for Experiment 1 (panel A) and Experiment 2 (panel B). Shaded 
squares represent incongruent trials and unshaded squares represent congruent trials. For 
Experiment 1, note the equivalent number of congruent and incongruent trials for each type of 
MC list and for each type of MI list. Only the intermediate timescale differs between present and 
absent lists. For Experiment 2, note the equivalent number of congruent and incongruent trials 
before the window in each list. In both experiments, note that the diagnostic phase is equivalent 




           
 
Figure 2. Reaction time and error rate results for Experiment 1 diagnostic phase trials. Error bars 
represent a 95% confidence interval. Panel A shows a significant three-way interaction was seen 
between congruence, PC, and window in reaction time. The presence of the window attenuated 
the Stroop effect in MC and exacerbated the Stroop effect in MI. Panel B shows a non-significant 










         
Figure 3. Reaction time and error rate results for Experiment 2 diagnostic trials. Error bars 
represent a 95% confidence interval. Panel A shows a non-significant interaction between 
congruence, window type in reaction time. Panel B shows a significant interaction between 
congruence and window type, such that the Stroop effect was larger following a congruent 
window in error rate. Note that the significant difference in error rate did not survive removing 





Experiment 1 Reaction Time and Error Rate 
Phase PC Window Trial Type Reaction Time Error % 
Induction MC Present Congruent 570 (74) 0.51 (0.62) 
   Incongruent 732 (98) 7.52 (8.00) 
  Absent Congruent 589 (79) 0.64 (0.80) 
   Incongruent 703 (89) 5.59 (5.27) 
 MI Present Congruent 620 (95) 0.56 (0.98) 
   Incongruent 684 (90) 2.41 (2.73) 
  Absent Congruent 618 (93) 0.48 (1.06) 
   Incongruent 688 (90) 3.30 (3.19) 
      
Diagnostic MC Present Congruent 636 (97) 0.74 (1.41) 
   Incongruent 698 (100) 4.39 (5.58) 
  Absent Congruent 615 (85) 0.59 (1.32) 
   Incongruent 693 (95) 4.20 (4.54) 
 MI Present Congruent 607 (89) 0.69 (1.49) 
   Incongruent 700 (102) 3.62 (5.45) 
  Absent Congruent 621 (90) 0.34 (1.11) 
   Incongruent 697 (98) 3.82 (4.20) 





Experiment 2 Reaction Time and Error Rate 
Phase Window Type Trial Type Reaction 
Time 
Error % 
Induction Congruent Window Congruent 610 (96) 0.77 (1.08) 
  Incongruent 714 (121) 3.57 (3.22) 
 Incongruent Window Congruent 614 (94) 0.62 (0.92) 
  Incongruent 721 (115) 4.08 (3.71) 
 Unbiased Window Congruent 617 (95) 0.33 (0.63) 
  Incongruent 722 (125) 4.37 (3.63) 
Diagnostic Congruent Window Congruent 622 (104) 0.62 (1.36) 
  Incongruent 720 (139) 5.43 (5.47) 
 Incongruent Window Congruent 637 (101) 0.50 (1.23) 
  Incongruent 730 (138) 3.33 (4.51) 
 Unbiased Window Congruent 626 (89) 0.40 (1.17) 
  Incongruent 723 (137) 3.78 (4.88) 







Experiment 1 F Table 
DV Phase Effect Df F P ηp
2 
Reaction Time Induction Congruence 1, 60 467.08 < .001 .886 
  PC 1, 60 1.80 .184 .029 
  Window 1, 60 1.208 .276 .020 
  Congruence * PC 1, 60 286.28 < .001 .827 
  Congruence * Window 1, 60 53.33 < .001 .471 
  PC * Window 1, 60 2.16 .147 .035 
  Congruence * PC * Window 1, 60 70.74 < .001 .541 
 Diagnostic Congruence 1, 60 298.82 < .001 .883 
  PC 1, 60 2.79 .100 .044 
  Window 1, 60 2.85 .096 .045 
  Congruence * PC 1, 60 20.16 < .001 .251 
  Congruence * Window 1, 60 0.03 .876 .000 
  PC * Window 1, 60 12.07 < .001 .167 
  Congruence * PC * Window 1, 60 18.72 < .001 .238 
Error Rate Induction Congruence 1, 60 64.86 < .001 .519 
  PC 1, 60 44.21 < .001 .424 
  Window 1, 60 1.69 .199 .027 
  Congruence * PC 1, 60 39.15 < .001 .395 
  Congruence * Window 1, 60 2.30 .135 .037 
  PC * Window 1, 60 11.87 .001 .165 
  Congruence * PC * Window 1, 60 12.93 < .001 .177 
45 
 
DV Phase Effect Df F P ηp
2 
 Diagnostic Congruence 1, 60 57.67 < .001 .490 
  PC 1, 60 0.23 .633 .004 
  Window 1, 60 2.50 .119 .040 
  Congruence * PC 1, 60 0.83 .367 .014 
  Congruence * Window 1, 60 0.18 .670 .003 
  PC * Window 1, 60 0.04 .842 .001 
  Congruence * PC * Window 1, 60 0.42 .521 .007 




















Experiment 2 F Table 
DV Phase Effect df F p ηp
2 
Reaction Time Induction Congruence 1, 59 242.68 < .001 .804 
  Window 2, 118 3.48 .034 .056 
  Congruence * Window 2, 118 0.13 .876 .002 
 Diagnostic Congruence 1, 59  99.77 < .001 .628 
  Window 2, 118 3.39 .037 .054 
  Congruence * Window 2, 118 0.42 .658 .007 
Error Rate Induction Congruence 1, 59 74.51 < .001 .558 
  Window 2, 118 0.46 .630 .008 
  Congruence * Window 2, 118 4.30 .016 .068 
 Diagnostic Congruence 1, 59 47.96 < .001 .448 
  Window 2, 118 6.41 .002 .098 
  Congruence * Window 2, 118 5.06 .008 .079 
Note: F table for Experiment 2 results 
 
